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The choices made by different individuals can reinforce each other. Network externalities provide an obvious example. Explanations for Microsoft’s domina-
tion of the operating system market, eBay’s domination of the online auction market, 
and the permanence of the QWERTY keyboard layout have been based on network 
effects.1 The rapid growth in popularity of social networking sites such as Facebook 
and MySpace also illustrates the importance of social reinforcement. People join 
because their friends have already done so. In his theory of entrapment, Avinash 
Dixit (2003) exploits reinforcing effects of people’s choices to show how some may 
be entrapped into joining a club in spite of the fact that its existence makes them 
worse off.2 There is an early precedent for the importance of social reinforcement in 
the work of Harvey Leibenstein (1950). Citing, as a precedent, the work of John Rae 
(1834), Leibenstein analyses situations in which one’s demand for a good increases 
with the number of others also buying it, using the term “bandwagon effects” to 
describe such situations. This is an early theory of fads and fashions, and is based on 
the recognition that other people’s actions can reinforce one’s own choices. Thomas 
Schelling’s (1978) work on tipping exemplifies the same insights. His iconic example 
1 See Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian (1999) and W. Brian Arthur (1989). For reviews of this area see Charles 
F. Manski (2000), and Nicholas Economides (1995).
2 The popularity of the QWERTY keyboard may be an illustration of entrapment, in the sense that a rede-
signed keyboard would enable everyone to type much faster than they currently do. However, there is no incentive 
for any one individual to learn the new system on his own because the keyboard he needs to purchase will have to 
be specially made and, hence, will be relatively expensive. Furthermore, it may not be available in other locations 
in which he is required to type.
* Heal: Columbia Business School, 616 Uris Hall, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027-6902 (e-mail: 
gmh1@columbia.edu); Kunreuther: Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA (e-mail: 
kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu). We are especially grateful to Larry Samuelson for assistance with this paper, 
and also grateful to Doug Bernheim, Vince Crawford, Rachel Croson, Avinash Dixit, Charley Holt, Alan Kirman, 
and a referee for constructive comments. Partial support from National Science Foundation Grant CMS-0527598 
is gratefully acknowledged.
† To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the articles 
page at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.2.1.86.
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is of a sudden change in the racial composition of a  neighborhood (Schelling 1971). 
Nonwhites move into an originally white neighborhood, and when the proportion 
reaches a critical level the neighborhood tips, and the remaining whites move out. 
Underlying this is an assumed (and hopefully outdated!) preference for neighbors 
of one’s own color, so that the movement into the neighborhood of nonwhites is 
mutually reinforcing, as is the movement out of whites. Recent work by David Card, 
Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein (2008) tests for tipping of the racial composition 
of residential neighborhoods in the United States over the period 1970–2000, and 
finds strong confirmation that once-white neighborhoods have tipped to all-minority 
neighborhoods once the minority population passes a relatively low threshold.
Mark Granovetter (1978) has described similar processes in the sociology lit-
erature. He discusses the adoption of new behaviors, which he models in terms of 
individuals’ adoption thresholds.3 Again, an action by one person makes similar 
actions by others more attractive by moving them toward or across their adoption 
thresholds. These threshold effects can be modelled by utility-maximizing choices 
when utility depends on the choices of others. Granovetter (1978) gives an inter-
esting example of entrapment into criminal behavior by groups of young males 
and cites many other examples of mutually reinforcing choices, from the adoption 
of birth-control practices in Korea to migration choices in third world countries, 
as well as education choices, and joining strikes or riots. Duncan J. Watts (2002) 
presents an analysis of cascades in a network of people all of whom show threshold 
effects in their behavior. Each agent is most influenced by those to whom she is 
nearest in the network, and Watts presents results on the probability of a cascade 
when the network is a random graph.4 William A. Brock (2004), drawing on results 
from Brock and Steven N. Durlauf (1995), looks at tipping in the context of dynami-
cal systems, and also builds on the idea of social reinforcement. In his models, the 
payoff of a choice depends on the choices of others; and there is a penalty for being 
“unfashionable,” which introduces the social reinforcement element.
The idea of social reinforcement has also been used in the finance literature. 
Harrison G. Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Jeremy C. Stein (2001) develop and test 
empirically the idea that stock market participation is affected by social interactions, 
and that a person’s chances of investing are greater if most of his peers also invest. 
Another application in the area of finance is to “positive feedback trading” in which 
investors buy more of an asset that has recently increased in value (Bradford J. DeLong 
et al. 1990 and Nicholas Barberis and Andre Shleifer 2003). So if some investors buy 
and raise prices, then others follow suit, leading to just the kind of threshold effects 
discussed by Granovetter (1978) and Watts (2002). As we will show, this behavior can 
be explained by a model in which social interactions are valued by decision makers. 
Abhijit V. Banerjee (1992) also develops a model of herd behavior that appears in some 
ways similar. People are influenced by the choices of others on the assumption (not 
always correct) that these choices are based on private information.
3 A person’s adoption threshold is the number of others she must see engaging in a new behavior before she too 
adopts that behavior. For early adopters this number is low and for late adopters it is high.
4 A cascade is the movement of the group from one pattern of behavior to another by a sequence of individual 
changes, just like the classic image of a sequence of dominoes falling.
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In cases of fashion-oriented behavior discussed by Leibenstein (1950), there is 
a perceived intrinsic value to being like others. In cases such as securities trad-
ing or adopting new habits, the value of following others is not intrinsic but rather 
is derived. Seeing the others make a choice gives the impression that this choice 
is less risky than it would otherwise appear to be. In trading models, transactions 
may reveal private information and allow this to diffuse through the market. Dunia 
López-Pintado and Watts (2006) make a similar distinction, but instead of the terms 
intrinsic and derived, they use the terms explicit and implicit externalities.
In all of these diverse situations, individuals’ choices can reinforce each other. 
Someone else choosing X over y makes that choice more attractive to me. In game-
theoretic terms, these are all games that show the increasing differences property 
that is associated with supermodularity. Agent i′s payoff to a choice increases if j 
makes that choice as well. One can also think of this as strategic complementarity.
Here, we formulate such reinforcing situations in game-theoretic terms, and model 
tipping, cascading, and entrapment as properties of the Nash equilibria of games. 
Using a static game-theoretic framework, we show that the potential for tipping and 
cascading will be widespread when games display increasing differences or social 
reinforcement. This means that a subset of the participants, sometimes a very small 
subset, can shift the system from one equilibrium to another just by changing their 
choices. This is the point of Schelling’s (1978) work, though he makes it in the con-
text of dynamic processes rather than Nash equilibria. We also show that if there are 
two (or more) equilibria, one of which Pareto dominates, then under very general 
conditions there is a coalition of agents who can tip the inefficient equilibrium to 
the efficient one. This is an interesting insight into the resolution of certain types of 
coordination problems. Finally, we give a characterization of tipping sets for a fam-
ily of symmetric games.
Our work originated from research on mutual reinforcement in the context of 
national security. Originally motivated by a desire to understand the impact of inter-
dependence in airline security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it has 
evolved to a more general model of how interdependence and reinforcement affects 
the incentive to invest in protective measures for any kind of network, including 
electronic networks such as computer networks.5 One of our early findings was that 
many networks exhibit a tipping phenomenon with respect to investments in secu-
rity. For certain values of state variables few agents invest and the system is vulner-
able and insecure. A small change can lead to everyone investing with a massive 
increase in security.
A. Examples
Consider a game with N agents in which each agent i has two strategies: si = 0 or 1. 
We use s−i to denote the choices of all agents other than i and take N = 10. The pay-
offs are
 ui = 0.5 if si = 0 and # (1) if si = 1,
5 For the national security applications see Heal and Kunreuther (2005) and Kunreuther and Heal (2003), and 
for computer network applications see Michael Kearns (2005).
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where  #(1) is the number of 1s in s−i, i.e., the number of other agents who choose 
1. There is social reinforcement in the choice of strategy 1. The more people choose 
it, the more attractive it is. In game theoretic terms, choosing 1 rather than 0 
shows increasing differences. Clearly {0, 0, … , 0} is a Nash equilibrium. Likewise, 
{1, 1, … , 1} is also a Nash equilibrium, which Pareto dominates. Any agent can tip 
the equilibrium of zeros to that of ones. Starting from this equilibrium, if agent 1 
changes from 0 to 1 then the payoffs to all other agents from choosing 1 are now 1 
> 0.5, so that 1 is their best response. As every agent is better off at {1, 1, … , 1} than 
at {0, 0, … , 0}, it may seem obvious that any agent would tip the latter to the former 
equilibrium. But the fact remains that when everyone else plays 0, any agent’s best 
response is to play 0 too. To make it rational for an agent to tip, we would have to 
think of a multi-round version of the game. In the first round, agent i would play 1 in 
response to everyone else’s 0, and would lose from doing so, but in the next round, 
all others would respond with 1 and, if this situation were to be maintained, agent i 
would compensate for her first-round loss.
Note that in contrast the equilibrium of ones can be tipped to that of zeros only by 
a coalition of all but one player, the trivial tipping coalition. In this case, the equilib-
rium of ones seems stable and that of zeros seems unstable. We can easily modify 
this example to be more like the Schelling tipping examples:
 ui = 4 if si = 0 and #(1) if si = 1.
In this case, we need five people to choose 1 to tip the equilibrium of zeros, which is 
now more stable. The equilibrium of ones is correspondingly less stable.
Now, consider a more complex example. The payoffs are
 ui (si, s−i) = 0.91i if si = 0 and = #(1) if si = 1.
Again, there is social reinforcement in the choice of strategy 1, but now agents 
are heterogeneous with respect to the payoff to 0. Again, we assume that N = 10. 
Again, we have equilibria of all zeros and all ones. In this case, agent N = 10 can tip 
the equilibrium of zeros.6 Note that no agent other than 10 can tip the equilibrium of 
zeros. Also, note that agent 10 can tip the equilibrium of ones back to that of zeros.7 
So, in this case, with N = 10, there is only one agent who can tip, and he can tip 
in either direction, from all zeros to all ones or vice versa. He alone can determine 
which equilibrium is chosen. In a certain sense he is a dictator.
All players except player 10 are worse off at the equilibrium of zeros than at the 
equilibrium of ones (player 10 is better off), so when player 10 tips an equilibrium 
of ones to one of zeros, he is making everyone else worse off, even though their best 
6 If agent 10 changes from 0 to 1, then the payoff to choosing 1 for any other agent is now 1. As 1 > 0.91, 
agent 1 will change too. But now the payoff to any other agent from choosing 1 is 2, and as 2 > 1.82, agent 2 will 
change also. This logic continues until all agents have changed, so that the only Nash equilibrium consistent with 
N choosing 1 is all 1s. Agent 10 starts a cascade.
7 If all are choosing 1 and then agent 10 changes, the payoff to 9 from choosing 1 is 8, and the payoff to choos-
ing 0 is 8.19. Now there are two agents choosing zero, so for agent 8 the payoff to 1 is 7 and to 0 is 7.28. The change 
by agent 10 initiates a cascade from one equilibrium to another.
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responses are now to choose 0. This illustrates the issue of entrapment discussed in 
Dixit (2003). In this example, player 10 can entrap all others at the equilibrium of 
all zeros.8
This second example can be thought of as a threshold model along the lines dis-
cussed by Granovetter (1978). Strategy 0 is the status quo, from which agent i will 
move if the payoff from moving exceeds 0.91i. Essentially this means that agent 1 
has a threshold of one, agent 2 has a threshold of two, etc. An interpretation of this 
example is that a uniform distribution of thresholds can generate cascading.
It was a stochastic version of the second example that led to our interest in these 
issues: 
 ui (0) = 0.91i and ui (1) = 10   #(1) _____ N − 1 + 0.5Q1 −   #(1) _____ N − 1  R .
So, the outcome of strategy 0 is certain, whereas that of strategy 1 is either 10 or 0.5 
with probabilities [#(1)/(N − 1)] or [1 − (#(1)/(N − 1))]. This structure arises in our 
earlier analysis of airline security problems, where the payoff to investing in secu-
rity (strategy 1) depends on and increases with the number of other airlines that also 
invest, #(1) (Heal and Kunreuther 2005). This example has most of the properties of 
the second (deterministic) example discussed above.
B. Thresholds
The concept of a threshold used in the sociological literature (Granovetter 1978; 
Watts 2002) can be modelled by interactions that display social reinforcement (and 
increasing differences) in the utility functions. Consider an agent who has to choose 
between 0 and 1, the payoffs to which are
 ui(0) = ai and ui (1) = #(1)1/2.
So there are social reinforcement effects in the choice of alternative 1, and these dis-
play diminishing returns. Clearly she will choose alternative 1 if #(1) >  a  i 2, and this 
is agent i’s threshold for choosing 1 over 0. This, in essence, is Leibenstein’s model, 
and underlies the discussions of Granovetter (1978) and Watts (2002). Note that the 
social reinforcement represented by the term #(1)1/2 could arise, as in Leibenstein’s 
case, from the intrinsic merits of being similar to others, or could reflect informa-
tional gains from seeing others adopting choice 1 and prospering from it.
8 Granovetter’s (1978) discussion of criminal behavior also seems to fit this framework. Talking about the 
behavior of delinquent boys, he states that “Most did not think it ‘right’ to commit illegal acts or even particularly 
want to do so. But group interaction was such that none could admit this without loss of status: in our terms, their 
threshold for stealing cars is low because daring, masculine acts bring status, and reluctance to join, once others 
have, carries the high cost of being labelled a ‘sissy.”’ (Granovetter 1978, 1,435) So illegal moves by those with 
low thresholds “entrap” others into following suit and make them worse off.
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I.  Tipping and Increasing Differences
Consider a game with N players i ∈ {1, 2, … , N}, each choosing a strategy si from 
the discrete set {0, 1} and having a utility function ui : {0, 1}N → r that depends on 
the choices of all agents. We have a natural order on the set of strategy vectors {0, 1}N 
given by the standard vector ordering9 on rN.
We assume that each agent’s payoff function ui shows what we term uniform strict 
increasing differences in the choices of strategies by other agents. Formally, this 
means that if 0i or 1i denotes a 0 or 1 in the i 
th position of the vector S of all strategy 
choices, and S−i denotes the vector of choices of all agents other than i, then ∃ ϵ > 0 
such that if S′−i > S−i, then
(1) ui (1i, S′−i ) − ui (0i, S′−i ) ≥ ϵ + ui (1i, S−i ) − ui (0i, S−i ).
This implies that the payoff to agent i of changing from zero to one increases by at 
least ϵ if another agent changes from zero to one. This is our formalization of “social 
reinforcement.” All of the examples discussed above satisfy this condition. In order 
to talk about tipping, we shall assume that the game has (at least) two Nash equilib-
ria, {0, 0, … , 0} and {1, 1, … , 1}. A policy-maker will naturally be interested in ruling 
out the inefficient equilibrium and ensuring an efficient outcome, as in a coordina-
tion problem (Vincent P. Crawford and Hans Haller 1990; Walter P. Heller 1986). 
We study conditions under which it is possible to do this by changing the strategies 
of a subset of the players. This is the tipping problem: a “tipping set” of agents can 
shift the equilibrium from one extreme to the other by changing their strategies. This 
“tipping set” is the set that can “entrap” other agents, using Dixit’s term.
Let T be an arbitrary subset of players. We are going to investigate whether agents 
in the set T can “tip” the system, i.e. can shift the equilibrium from {0, 0, … , 0} to 
{1, 1, … , 1} by changing strategy. To do this, we define the T-game as the above game 
with the additional constraint that for all players in T the only permissible strategy 
choice is si = 1. If the T-game has {1, 1, … , 1} as its only equilibrium, then we say that 
T is a tipping set or T-set. The key point here is that when agents in T choose strategy 
1, this is also the best response for all agents not in T. So those in T can lead others 
to change strategy by changing their own strategies.
A set is a minimal T-set if it is a T-set, and no subset is a T-set. Clearly if T is a 
T-set then, getting the members of T to adopt strategy 1 will rule out the equilibrium 
of zeros. Members of the set T can tip the equilibrium and can force the system to 
the efficient outcome. If T is a small subset of N, then this can be an important policy 
tool.
Now, we show that in certain cases a minimal T-set can be formed by a simple 
algorithm in which we rank agents by a very natural characteristic and then pick 
the first K ≤ N in this ranking. Intuitively the characteristic is a measure of the 
changes in other agents’ payoffs that result when an agent changes her strategy 
from 0 to 1. It is a measure of the externalities that an agent generates, and a 
9 We use A > B to show that A exceeds B in at least one component and is no less in all components, and A ≥ 
B to show that it is at least as great in all components.
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measure of the degree to which she can reinforce the choices of others. Next, we 
give conditions for the existence of a tipping set and note that such a set always 
exists at an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated by another. All proofs are in the 
Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: under assumption 1 of uniform strict increasing differences, and 
with a large enough number of agents, there exists a tipping set with less than N − 1 
agents that tips the equilibrium with all 0s to that with all 1s.
COROLLARY 2: If there are two equilibria, one of which Pareto dominates the 
other, then with uniform strict increasing differences, and with a large enough num-
ber of agents, there is a nontrivial tipping set that tips the dominated to the undomi-
nated equilibrium.
It is easy to see the need for the condition that the number of agents is ‘large 
enough.’ Each time any agent changes strategy from 0 to 1, the payoff to every 
other agent from such a change increases. For some agents this payoff is initially 
negative. For the system to tip, the payoff from the change has to be positive for 
every agent. Therefore, we need enough agents to change to bring the most negative 
payoffs above zero, and for this to be possible we need enough agents. The number 
of agents k that is ‘large enough’ depends on the parameter ϵ in the definition of 
increasing difference in equation (1). The larger ϵ is, the smaller the critical number. 
To be precise, we show in the proof of Proposition 1 that10
 k > 1 +   Maxi {ui (0 N−1, 1i ) − ui (0 N−1, 0i )} _______________________ ϵ  ,
so that the number of agents has to exceed one plus the ratio of the maximum payoff 
to a change in strategy from 0 to 1 when all others choose 0, to the minimum rein-
forcement effect. If the reinforcement effect is large relative to the payoff change, 
the number of agents needed is small, and with a small reinforcement effect, many 
agents are needed.
These results have implications for coordination problems. These may be solv-
able if we can identify tipping sets. To be interesting, this requires that these sets be 
significantly smaller than the population as a whole. The examples have shown that 
this can be the case, and the next proposition sheds some more light on the nature of 
tipping sets. If agents T ⊂ N form a tipping set and can shift the equilibrium from all 
zeros to all ones and gain in the transition, then, in an intuitive sense, it is rational 
for them to coordinate and change the equilibrium. But this statement can only make 
sense outside of the context of the original Nash game.
Let (0 N−2, 1i, 1j, ) denote a vector of strategy choices consisting of zeros in all 
positions other than i and j with 1s in the i-th and j-th positions. In order to provide 
10 (0N−1, 1i ) is a vector with (N−1) zeros and a 1 as the i-th coordinate, see the discussion preceding equation (A1) in the Appendix.
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a simple characterization of a T-set, we focus on the special case in which the dif-
ference Δij (0):
(2) Δij (0) = [ uj (0 N−2, 1i , 1j ) − uj (0 N−2, 1i , 0j ) ] 
 − [ uj (0 N−2, 0i , 1j ) − uj (0 N−2, 0i , 0j ) ]
is independent of the index j, i.e., the effects of i’s change of strategy are symmetric 
over other agents. In addition, we assume that Δij (s−i−j ) (see equation (A1) in the 
Appendix) is independent of s−i−j and does not depend on the strategies chosen by 
others. So the process of social reinforcement is symmetric. This rules out close 
personal ties, such as arise if my payoff is affected more by the behavior of friends 
and colleagues than by that of people not known personally to me. We call these two 
conditions of symmetry and independence, taken together, condition SI.
(SI) Δij (0) = Δik (0) = Δi (0) = Δi 
A sufficient condition for SI is that an agents’s payoff depends on the number of 
other agents choosing each strategy and not on their identities. It is implied by an 
anonymity condition.11 For each agent i, Δi is the alteration in the payoff that all 
other agents get from switching strategy from 0 to 1 as a result of agent i changing 
from 0 to 1, a uniform externality that i, by changing strategy, imposes on others 
when they change strategy.
Given this, agents can be ranked unambiguously by the values of their Δi func-
tions, and we assume without loss of generality that they are numbered so that 
Δ1 ≥ Δ2 ≥ ....... ≥ ΔN . An agent’s ability to tip the inefficient equilibrium is measured 
by its Δ, and we show that a minimal T-set consists of agents with the greatest Δs.
PROPOSITION 3: Given SI, if a minimal T-set exists, then for some integer f it 
consists of the first f agents when agents are ranked by the value of Δi .
Proposition 3 shows that the agents that are most capable of changing the game’s 
equilibrium are those that generate the largest externalities to others or play the 
greatest role in social reinforcement. They may be people who are perceived as lead-
ers in their community. Within the structure defined by SI, we can say that increas-
ing differences being sufficiently large12 is necessary and sufficient for tipping of the 
inefficient equilibrium. A numerical example of tipping at the inefficient equilibrium 
of a super modular game is given in Heal and Kunreuther (2005).
cascading.—A cascade is a sequence of events in which a change of strategy by 
one agent leads another to change, the changes of the two together lead a third to 
change, and so on. It is a version of the classic domino effect. Dixit (2003) models 
11 Such conditions are common in social choice problems. For an illustration of such a condition in a similar 
context to ours, see Todd Sandler (1992).
12 In the sense of (A5) in the Appendix.
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this well, and we follow his framework. In our context, a cascade will begin from 
an equilibrium where all agents choose si = 0. A cascade of length k is a situation 
in which if 1 were to change from 0 to 1 but all others were to remain at 0, then 2’s 
best response would be 1. If 1 and 2 were to choose 1 and all others 0, then 3’s best 
response would be 1. If 1, 2, and 3 were to choose 1 and all others 0, then 4’s best 
response would be 1, and so on up to and including agent k. The strategy tuple in 
which agents 1 through k choose 1, and all others choose 0, is a Nash equilibrium, 
and k may be less than N.
If we think of the game as one in which moves are made sequentially by players 
in ascending order, if the first mover chooses 1 (perhaps as a result of factors out-
side the game as we have defined it, such as policy inducements), then the second 
mover chooses 1 and so on up to and including the k-th mover, and thereafter all will 
choose 0 and the outcome will be an equilibrium. If the only equilibria involve either 
all zeros or all ones, then the outcome of such a cascade will be the equilibrium with 
all 1 s, and this will be attained from the equilibrium of zeros by persuading agent 
1 to change strategy.
Formally we have a cascade of length k at the Nash equilibrium {0, 0, … , 0} if 
agents can be numbered so that agent 2’s best response to {1, s2, 0, … , 0} is s2 = 1, 
agent 3’s best response to {1, 1, s3, 0, … , 0} is s3 = 1, and for all agents j for j ≤ k the 
best response to {1, 1, … , sj, 0, … , 0} is sj = 1, and in addition {1, 1, … , sk = 1, 0, … , 0} 
is a Nash equilibrium. Using the framework and assumptions of the previous sec-
tion, we can set out sufficient conditions for a cascade of length k.
We can give a formal characterization of the conditions for a cascade of length k 
as follows.
PROPOSITION 4: A cascade of length k occurs if for all 2 ≤ j ≤ k,
 j−2 j−2 2 2
 Δj−1 ≥ uj q1, … , 1 0, … , 0r − uj q1, … , 1, 0, 1, 0, … , 0r ,
and for k < j ≤ N, the opposite inequality holds.
The proof is obvious. Cascading, like tipping, depends on a game exhibiting 
“enough increasing difference.” 
II.  Applications
A. Schelling’s Work
Schelling (1978) provides a number of examples of the role of a critical mass in 
inducing tipping. In these examples individuals make a decision about being part 
of a process or group based on what they see others doing. A key example is given 
by individuals’ decisions about whether to reside in a neighborhood, which they do 
if there are enough others like themselves who are already there. Schelling’s most 
famous example of racial segregation in residential districts was essentially dynamic 
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with a sequence of changes evolving over time (Schelling 1971). However it is pos-
sible to capture much of what was interesting in and essential to that model with a 
static formulation identical to that used above.
Consider a population of P people of a certain type living in a neighborhood. 
Each has two possible strategies: stay S or move M. The payoff to each depends on 
how many others of the group do the same. The payoff to staying is the number of 
others who stay, # (S), and the payoff to moving is the number of others who move, 
# (M). Clearly all staying or all moving are both Nash equilibria, and if # (M) > 
# (S), then the best response of all who have not moved is to move, so that we have 
the possibility of tipping. This game displays increasing differences, as the payoff 
to changing from S to M increases with the number of people who have already 
changed.
B. Security
As shown in Kunreuther and Heal (2003) there is a wide range of security-related 
problems that exhibit features of supermodularity and in which tipping could occur. 
One area that naturally falls into this class is computer security. Here, the central issue 
is the incentive each agent has to invest in protecting himself against a possible virus, 
when he knows that he may be infected from other agents. There is an interesting exam-
ple in Kearns (2005) that illustrates this problem in the context of a shared hard drive.
III.  Conclusions
Social reinforcement of choices is widespread, and may even be the norm in many 
areas of behavior. It can be modelled by games showing increasing differences, and 
naturally generates a propensity for tipping and cascading. We have proven that for 
a wide range of such situations there are nontrivial tipping sets, and have character-
ized them for a class of symmetric cases.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Key to our analysis is the effect on agent j′s payoff of changing strategy from 0 
to 1, and how this effect changes when another agent, say i, also changes from 0 to 
1. How much does i′s move reinforce j ? By the increasing differences property (1), 
we know that the change by i will increase the effect on j′s payoff of the change by j. 
Let s−i−j , 1i, 0j denote the vector of strategies in which all agents k other than i, j are 
choosing sk ∈ s−i−j and i, j are choosing 1 and 0, respectively. Define
 Δj (i = 0, s−i−j ) = uj (s−i−j , 0i , 1j ) − uj (s−i−j , 0i , 0j )
and
 Δj (i = 1, s−i−j ) = uj (s−i−j , 1i , 1j ) − uj (s−i−j , 1i , 0j ).
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These are the returns to agent j from changing from 0 to 1 when agent i chooses 
either 0 (in the first line) or 1 (in the second line) and everyone else chooses s−i−j . 
The difference between these returns is
(A1) Δij (s−i−j ) = Δj (i = 1, s−i−j ) − Δj (i = 0, s−i−j ) ≥ 0.
This is the increase in the return to j′s change of strategy as a result of i′s change 
of strategy, and from the condition of increasing differences (1) we know that this is 
positive. It is a measure of the positive externalities or social reinforcement gener-
ated by a change of i′s strategy, such reinforcement being guaranteed by increasing 
differences. As more agents i change their strategy from 0 to 1 there will be a greater 
increase in utility for the other agents j in the system.
We focus on equation (A1) when all agents other than i and j are choosing strategy 
0 so as to derive conditions for tipping the equilibrium of zeros to that of ones:
(A2) Δij (0) = [ uj (0 N−2, 1i , 1j ) − uj (0 N−2, 1i, 0j ) ] 
 − [ uj (0 N−2, 0i , 1j ) − uj , (0 N−2, 0i, 0j ) ],
where 0 N−2 indicates that there are N − 2 zeros in the positions other than i and 
j. Note that if all ones is a Nash equilibrium, then if all agents other than i choose 
strategy 1, i’s best response must be 1, so that N − 1 agents form a trivial tipping set. 
For a tipping set to be interesting, it must contain fewer than N − 1 agents.
Consider the following sequence of inequalities, which link the equilibrium with 
all zeros to that with all ones in a series of steps in each of which an additional agent 
changes strategy from 0 to 1, and which hold by the increasing differences property 
of equation (1):
(A3) ui (0 N−1, 1i ) − ui (0 N−1, 0i ) + ϵ < ui (0 N−2, 11, 1i ) − ui (0 N−2, 11, 0i )
 ui (0 N−2, 11, 1i ) − ui (0 N−2, 11, 0i ) + ϵ < ui (0 N−3, 11, 12, 1i ) − ui (0 N−3, 11, 12, 0i )
 ui (11, 12, … , 1N−2, 0j , 1i ) − ui (11, 12, … , 1N−2, 0j , 0i ) + ϵ 
 < ui (11, 12, … , 1N−1, 1i ) − ui (11, 12, … , 1N−1, 0i ).
If we take the first inequality,
 ui (0 N−1, 1i ) − ui (0 N−1, 0i ) + ϵ < ui (0 N−2, 11, 1i ) − ui (0 N−2, 11, 0i ),
we see that the payoff to agent i from a strategy change is raised by at least ϵ when 
agent 1 also picks strategy 1. The second inequality,
 ui (0 N−2, 11, 1i ) − ui (0 N−2, 11, 0i ) + ϵ < ui (0 N−3, 11, 12, 1i ) − ui (0 N−3, 11, 12, 0i ),
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shows that the payoff to i from the change from 0 to 1 is again increased by ϵ when 
agent 2 changes from 0 to 1. The inequalities repeat this process changing one addi-
tional agent’s strategy each time. Working back from a typical inequality in (A3) we 
have that
 ui (0 N−k, 11, 12, 1i ) − ui (0 N−k, 11, 12, 0i ) > (k − 1)ϵ + ui (0 N−1, 1i ) − ui (0 N−1, 0i ).
Note that ui(0 N−1, 1i ) − ui (0 N−1, 0i ) < 0 as the vector of all zeros is a Nash 
equilibrium, so 0 is a best response for i. Note also that, to the contrary, the last 
difference ui (11, 12, … , 1N−1, 1i ) − ui (11, 12, … , 1N−1, 0i ) > 0 is positive as the 
vector of all ones is also a Nash equilibrium, and now 1 is a best response. As the 
sequence of differences starts negative and ends positive it must change sign: for 
N sufficiently large there will be a k < N − 1 such that (k − 1)ϵ − ui (0 N−1, 1i )+ ui (0 N−1, 0i ) > 0, and the first k agents will then form a T- set. To be precise, we 
need k to satisfy
 k > 1 +  ui (0 N−1, 1i ) − ui (0 N−1, 0i )   ___________________ ϵ  for all i.
Thus, k has to exceed one plus the maximum over all agents of the ratio of the 
change in agent i’s payoff from changing from 0 to 1 when all others choose 0 
to the parameter ϵ, which indicates the minimum magnitude of the reinforcement 
effects between agents. The larger the reinforcement effects, the smaller the value of 
k needed. Once the first k agents have chosen 1 as a strategy, this is the best response 
of all other agents. This proves that a T- set exists and is not the trivial tipping set of 
all agents but one.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Let {0t, 1N−t−1, 1k } denote the following vector: the kth coordinate is 1, t coordi-
nates are zero, all others (of which there are N − t − 1 ) are 1, and the first N − t − 1 
coordinates are 1 if k > N − t, and the first N − t are 1 otherwise.
From (A1) and (A3) and (SI), we can write
(A4) uj (0 N−K−1, 1K, 1j ) − uj (0 N−K−1, 1K, 0) = uj (0 N−1, 1) − uj (0 N−1, 0) +  ∑ 
i=1
i=K−1 Δi .
Hence, finding a t such that ui(0 N−t, 11, … , 1t , 1i ) − ui (0 N−t, 11, … , 1t , 0i ) > 0 is the 
same as finding a t such that uj (0 N−1, 1) − uj (0 N−1, 0) +  ∑ i=1 i=t−1 Δi > 0 or  ∑ i=1 i=t−1 Δi > uj (0 N−1, 0) − uj (0 N−1, 1).
If f < N is a T-set, then for all j > f we must have uj (0 N−f−1, 1f, 1j ) − uj(0 N−f, 1f ) ≥ 0. 
By (A4), this inequality is equivalent to
(A5)  ∑ 
i=1
i=f−1
 Δi ≥ uj (0 N−1, 0) − uj (0 N−1, 1) ∀ j > f.
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To construct a minimal T- set, we need to find the smallest number f for which equa-
tion (A5) holds. We get this by ranking agents by the size of Δi and first choosing 
first those with the largest value of Δi, i.e., those that create the largest externalities 
or that exhibit increasing differences to the greatest degree.
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